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TOURO LAW REVIEW
In O'Connell, defendant, because he was a repeat offender,
was indicted on a felony charge of driving while under the
influence of alcohol. 1440 There was an eight month delay
between the filing of the charge and the notice of readiness. 1441
The court held that unless the failure of a motion to dismiss was
attributable to trial strategy, it constituted a denial of
representation by effective counsel. 1442
The federal courts addressed the lack of a motion to dismiss in
Barker v. Wingo, 144 3 where the Supreme Court denied a claim
for a violation of the right to a speedy trial because it was part of
the defendant's trial strategy. 1444 An accomplice who was being
tried first had a strong chance of acquittal, and Mr. Barker did
not object to the delay of his own trial while the accomplice was
tried. 1445 The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the lack of
a motion to dismiss on the grounds of violation of a speedy trial
because of incompetent counsel can be a situation warranting
dismissal on appeal.1446 The failure to raise an issue which will
result in dismissal of the charges, is thus ineffective assistance of
counsel in the federal courts as well as in New York State courts,
and is violative of both constitutions.
People v. Morin1 447
(decided April 15, 1993)
Defendant appealed his conviction of several counts of sodomy,
sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child on several
grounds, including denial of his right to effective assistance of
1439. 133 A.D.2d 970, 971, 521 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (3d Dep't 1987).
1440. Id. at 970, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
1441. Id. at 971, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
1442. Id.
1443. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). But see United States v. Eight Thousand Eight
Hundred and Fifty Dollars in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 568 (1983)
(holding that 18 months was not unreasonable delay in filing judicial forfeiture
action).
1444. Id. at 534-36.
1445. Id. at 535.
1446. Id. at 536.
1447. 192 A.D.2d 791, 596 N.Y.S.2d 508 (3d Dep't 1993).
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counsel in violation of his State 144 8  and Federal 1449
Constitutional rights. 1450 He also claimed he was denied his due
process right to be present "at all material stages of a criminal
prosecution" including when his counsel questioned potential
jurors regarding their fitness to serve. 145 1 The appellate division
held that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel, 1452 and that the rule established in People v.
Antommarchi1 453  did not apply retroactively because
Antommarchi implicates cases in which jury selection occurred
after the decision was rendered, which was on October 27, 1992.
The court found defendant's first constitutional claim to be
meritless. 1454 Defendant claimed he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to make certain
1448. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions... ."Id.
1449. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This provision provides in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." Id.
1450. Morin, 192 A.D.2d at 792, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 510. Defendant objected
to the introduction into evidence of an admission he allegedly made, however,
since no objection was made at trial, the issue was not reviewable. Id.
Defendant also argued several counts of the indictment were unsupported by
the evidence. Id. He also claimed that the jury was improperly instructed. Id.
The court found all the claims to be meritless. Id. Defendant's only successful
point on appeal was that his sentence was unduly harsh. Id. at 793, 596
N.Y.S.2d at 512. Accordingly, the appellate division reduced defendant's
sentence. Id.
1451. Id. at 793, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
1452. Id.
1453. 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.E.2d 95, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992) (holding that
the questioning of jurors is a material stage of trial at which defendant's have a
constitutional right to be present); see also People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519,
606 N.E.2d 1318, 591 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992) (holding rule in Antommarchi
should be applied prospectively only); People v. Elliot, 157 Misc. 2d 148, 596
N.Y.S.2d 662 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 1993) (holding that since the right to
jury trial was a fundamental one the fact that the defendant did not raise the
objection at trial did not prevent the defendant from moving to set aside the
verdict later).
1454. Morin, 192 A.D.2d at 793, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
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motions. 1455 However, the appellate division disagreed, holding
that counsel's decisions were strategically reasonable and did not
constitute inadequate representation. 1456 Defendant failed to
prove that counsel's decisions were not based on trial
strategy. 1457 Furthermore, some of counsel's strategic decisions
were successful, including the dismissal of two charges against
the defendant. 1
458
Defendant's second constitutional argument was also
unsuccessful. Defendant, based on the rule in Antommarchi
claimed he should have been present when jurors were
questioned by his attorney. However, the court noted that the
court of appeals, in Mitchell, held that the right to be present at
the questioning of witnesses arises from a statutory right under
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 260.20,1459 and not a
federal constitutional right. The Mitchell court stated:
It is manifest that Antommarchi was decided as a question of state
law. The basis for the decision is found in N.Y.C.P.L. which
provides that a defendant 'must be present during the trail of an
-indictment' . . . [a]lthough the statue has underlying due process
concerns, its protective scope is broader than the constitutional
right it encompasses. 1460
1455. Id. Defendant claimed counsel failed to make a motion to sever the
trial and failed to make objections concerning the admission of evidence. Id.
Defendant also claimed counsel should have allowed him to testify at trial. Id.
1456. Id.
1457. Id.; see also People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 525 N.E.2d 698, 530
N.Y.S.2d 52 (1988). The Rivera court held that "it is incumbent on defendant
to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for
counsel's failure to request a particular hearing. Absent such a showing, it will
be presumed that counsel acted in a competent manner and exercised
professional judgment in not pursuing a hearing." Id. at 709, 530 N.E.2d at
698, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
1458. Morin, 192 A.D.2d at 793, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
1459. N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1982). The statute
provides in relevant part: "A defendant must be personally present during the
trial of an indictment." Id.
1460. People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519, 526, 606 N.E.2d 1318, 1384, 591
N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (1992); see also People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450, 606
N.E.2d 953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1992) (prospective jurors were questioned at
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Therefore, Mitchell held that state courts can determine whether
to apply a state court decision retroactively or prospectively. 
146 1
Accordingly, since defendant's trial took place prior to the
Antommarchi decision and that rule is applied prospectively,
defendant could not rely on this rule as a basis for his appeal. 
1462
Under federal law, the Supreme Court in Griffith v.
Kentucky1463 has held that "a new constitutional rule is to be
applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review." 1464
However, in Mitchell, the court pointed out that the Griffith rule
is not binding on state courts when no constitutional principles
are involved. 1465 State courts have the power to determine
whether or not a state rule should be applied retroactively.
1466
Accordingly, since state law applied to defendant's claim, the
state rule of retroactivity was applicable. Thus, the court
affirmed defendant's conviction on both constitutional claims.
In re Jamie TT. 146
7
(decided July 1, 1993)
The Department of Social Services, petitioner in a child abuse
proceeding, and the law guardian, claimed that the child's
trial when defendant was not present but the court upheld that defendant's
conviction applying the Antommarchi rule prospectively).
1461. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 526, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
993. Mitchell applied the rule announced in People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213,
423 N.E.2d 366, 440 N.Y.S.2d 889, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981). The
rule follows a three part test in determining what effect a rule would have if
applied retroactively. The court looks at the purpose of the rule, the extent of
reliance on the rule, and the effect its retroactive application would have on
administration. Id.
1462. The verdict in the instant case was rendered on June 28, 1991.
1463. 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (holding courts must apply rules retroactively).
1464. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d at 528, 606 N.E.2d at 1384, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 993
(citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 314).
1465. Id.
1466. Id.; see also American Trucking v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)
(holding state courts can determine how to apply their own rules as they see
fit).
1467. 191 A.D.2d 132, 599 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep't 1993).
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